An empirical analysis of the counterfactual: a merger and divestiture in the Australian cigarette industry by Pham, Vivienne & Prentice, David
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
An empirical analysis of the
counterfactual: a merger and divestiture
in the Australian cigarette industry
Vivienne Pham and David Prentice
La Trobe University
15. November 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26713/
MPRA Paper No. 26713, posted 16. November 2010 05:49 UTC
An Empirical Analysis of the Counterfactual: A Merger and
Divestiture in the Australian Cigarette Industry
Vivienne Pham and David Prentice∗
15 November 2010
Abstract
In this paper we empirically analyse two counterfactual situations facing an anti-trust
authority following the merger of two of the largest international cigarette companies. First we
estimate a nested logit model of demand for cigarettes. The implied elasticity of demand for
smoking and implied marginal costs are both broadly consistent with the limited independent
estimates available. We then use the model to simulate the proposed merger and the partial
divestiture that was accepted by the Australian anti-trust authority. A comparison of the
relative price changes predicted by the divestiture simulation with the actual post-divestiture
price changes shows the model successfully anticipated the behaviour of the divested brands.
This suggests structural econometric analysis using a nested logit may be usefully utilised
by anti-trust authorities to assess the welfare implications of proposed mergers and partial
divestitures.
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1 Introduction
In 1999 a merger took place internationally between two of the largest cigarette companies in
the world, British American Tobacco and Rothmans International. Anti-trust authorities around
the world responded to this merger, within a few months, by imposing various partial divestiture
regimes on the local subsidiaries. In doing so, each anti-trust authority would have considered
various counterfactuals including permitting the merger and various divestiture agreements. This
brings to the fore two issues for consideration. First, whether the decisions of the anti-trust
authorities were welfare improving and second, whether simple structural econometric models
could have been effectively utilised in analysing the different counterfactuals.
Since the 1990s, highly sophisticated random coefficient logit models suitable for analysing
mergers between oligopolists producing differentiated products have been developed (Ackerberg et
al, 2007). However, the technical and computational demands of these models have limited their
use even in academic circles. Anti-trust authorities are unlikely to have the time or expertise to
estimate and simulate these models for a quick, robust merger analysis. The nested logit model, a
special case of the random coeffficients models, has the advantages of being relatively simple and
quick to estimate. However, the price of simplicity is that the functional form restricts the nature
of the relationship between brands that can be estimated. Whether the simpler nested logit model
yields useful results for anti-trust authorities can only be determined by validation against actual
events — a practice that is becoming of increasing interest.1
In this paper we estimate a nested logit model of the Australian cigarette market using a new
database compiled from documents made public as a result of extensive litigation against the U.S.
cigarette industry. We then analyse two counterfactual scenarios associated with 1999 merger
that would have been considered by the the local anti-trust authority, the Australian Competition
and Consumer Commission (ACCC). Specifically we simulate both the merger, which would have
reduced the number of large cigarette firms operating in Australia from three to two, and the
partial divestiture accepted by the ACCC and their consequent impacts on consumer welfare. We
also perform a validation exercise, comparing the pattern of relative price movements predicted by
1Peters (2006) compares results for actual mergers in the U.S. airline industry, and Keane (2010) argues more
generally for validation of the results of structural models.
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the model with those that actually happened following the divestiture.
While the model successfully predicts the pattern of price movements for the entrant receiving
the divested brands, results for the merged firm and the other incumbent are not as conclusive.
The results are significant for two reasons. First, it provides quantitative evidence on the potential
consequences of mergers and forced partial divestitures. There have been no studies estimating
market power at the brand level for the cigarette industry, relatively few empirical studies of
mergers between differentiated product oligopolists and very little work on divestitures in general
(Jayaratne and Shapiro, 2000; Tenn and Yun, forthcoming). Second, it provides an example of
how a relatively simple econometric technique can be used to provide information for anti-trust
authorities who have little time to empirically assess competition issues around specific mergers.
The paper is structured as follows: the next section details the background of the cigarette
industry and describes the merger. Section three reviews the nested logit model we use for esti-
mation. Section four describes the data used in estimation and section five discusses results and
interpretation. Section six presents the results of our simulations and the validation exercise and
section seven summarises our conclusions.
2 The Australian cigarette industry
During our observation period, 1974 to 1992, Rothmans Holdings Ltd, WD & HO Wills Holdings
Ltd (owned by British American Tobacco) and Philip Morris (Australia) Ltd, each supplied, on
average, about a third of the Australian cigarette market. Like many industrialised economies, the
market for cigarettes in Australia has been steadily declining since the 1970’s. In 1974 about 36%
of Australian adults smoked and by 1992 this percentage declined to about 25% (Hill and White,
1995). While the discovery of the negative health effects of smoking was a fundamental cause of
the decline, it has been estimated that demographic and income changes, government policies on
taxation and regulation of advertising and consumption also contributed to the continuing decline
in demand in Australia.2 In this section we focus on the developments in the cigarette industry
2See Bardsley and Olekans (1999). For a detailed account of the evolution of the Australian cigarette market up
to the early 1980s see Walker (1984) and for developments in the U.S. see Brandt (2007).
3
Table 1: Excise and state tax rates
Year Excise NSW VIC QLD
1975 9.92 0 2.5 0
1980 9.92 10 12 0
1984 8.63 15 25 0
1990 8.27 35 35 30
1995 11.90 100 75 100
Excise is dollars per kilogram.
(deflated by CPI (1970 base))
Rates (%) for three largest states.
from the start of our sample period up to the merger.
2.1 Government intervention in the cigarette market
The government intervened in four ways to discourage cigarette smoking. First, taxes were in-
creased enormously to discourage smoking. The Federal government already had an excise on
tobacco in the early 1970s, which was based on the weight of the tobacco. But from 1975, state
governments introduced ad valorem taxes on cigarettes, the rates of which increased from about
10% in 1980 to almost 100% across all states by 1995 (Table 1). Second, the government regulated
advertising, including general marketing practices. Direct advertising on television and radio was
phased out by 1976. Further regulation ultimately prohibited advertising in print media, broad-
cast media, billboards, cinema, sporting events and sponsorships, or any other outdoor signs. This
was complemented by campaigns against smoking by government and non-governmental organiza-
tions. Third, from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, smoking in workplaces and public places was
increasingly restricted (Winstanley et al, 1995)
Fourth, the cigarette industry was specifically monitored by a series of prices surveillance
agencies between 1973 and 1996. Between 1973 and 1982, prices of large firms in certain industries,
like the cigarette industry, were monitored by the Prices Justification Tribunal (PJT). PJT annual
reports show that between 1973 and 1974, firms were required to notify the PJT of proposed
price increases. While the PJT had no powers to control prices, they could respond with highly
publicised recommendations. In one instance WD & HO Wills sought an increase of 1.9% but
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the PJT recommended that the firm not increase prices.3 Nieuwenhuysen and Norman (1976)
note that after 1975, the PJT became less activist, and over time it became more like a pure
monitoring body until its abolition in 1981. In 1984, price monitoring was re-established through
the Prices Surveillance Authority (PSA).4 After a review of cigarette company prices in 1985, the
PSA sought an average reduction of 0.5 per cent in prices to occur by the following year (PSA,
1985). Ironically, the PSA’s demand was at odds with the government’s efforts to deter cigarette
consumption through tax increases. Price monitoring only ceased in 1996, following evidence cited
by the ACCC of increasing competitive behaviour in the cigarette industry (ACCC, 1996).5
2.2 Cigarette industry responses to tax increases
The cigarette companies responded to the increases in tobacco and cigarette taxation by moving
toward the ‘value’ or ‘discount’ segment of the market. The typical number of cigarettes per packet
in many of the leading brands increased from 20 to 25 and then, in some brands, up to as high as
50. The larger packs featured lower per-stick prices. The lower per-stick prices proved to appeal
to the lower socio-economic classes which were still a sizeable proportion of smoker demographics
(Hill and White, 1995). Winstanley et al (1995) also argued that this was also a tactic to entice
new smokers who may have been worried about the long term expenses of a cigarette habit. Profit
margins were to some extent preserved because the large pack cigarettes had lower marginal costs.
Winstanley et al (1995) report that discount brands were around ten per cent lighter per stick
than other brands and this meant lower input costs and lower federal excise per stick. In addition,
lower per-stick prices meant lower state government taxes. Winstanley et al (1995) calculated that
tax was approximately 20% lower on the discount brands than other brands.
The discount segment was created in the mid-1970s by, initially, extending already successful
brands from packs of 20s to 25s. At the time it was considered a less risky marketing strategy than
3This occurred on 29 August 1974 (Prices Justification Tribunal, 1974-1975).
4The PSA’s activities were subsumed in 1995 by the Trade Practices Commission and then, in 1996, the ACCC.
5There have been no empirical analyses of the effect of the PJT and the PSA on market power by firms so their
effect on behaviour has not been established. These institutions do not affect our estimation since our demand
model does not require any assumption about the nature of competition. Furthermore, the cigarette industry was
no longer monitored by the PSA when the merger took place. But, the PSA was monitoring in the period when
we estimate marginal costs, which does require an assumption about competition, and hence our estimates during
this period are subject to this caveat.
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Table 2: Market shares of largest brands in 1992
Mainstream Discount
Brand Company Share Brand Company Share
Winfield Rothmans 15.8 Longbeach Philip Morris 15.2
Benson & Hedges Wills 8.5 Peter Jackson Philip Morris 13.6
Dunhill Rothmans 3.4 Horizon* Wills 11.2
Alpine Philip Morris 3.3 Holiday Rothmans 7.1
Stradbroke Wills 5.3
Escort* Wills 2.7
* Divested to Imperial Tobacco Australia in 1999.
Source: Philip Morris (1993).
undertaking costly launches of new brands — particularly with greater restrictions on advertising.
This proved to be successful and larger packs of 30s, 40s and 50s were introduced. The larger packs
were increasingly associated with new brands or relaunched older smaller brands. The market share
of the 20s segment fell from 47% in 1980 to 4% in 1991, and the 25s segment rose from 51% in 1980
to 64% in 1983 (Beriot, 1993). By 1992, 30s, 35s, 40s and 50s made up 16%, 11%, 14% and 17%
of sales respectively (Beriot, 1993). The market shares of the largest brands in the mainstream
and discount segments in 1992 are summarised in Table 2.
2.3 The 1999 merger and divestiture
In January 1999, British-American Tobacco PLC, Rembrant Group Limited, Compagnie Fi-
nanciere Richemont AG and Rothmans International BV agreed to merge. In both Canada and
New Zealand the anti-trust authorities required divestitures of brands.6 The Australian sub-
sidiaries, WD & HO Wills Holdings Ltd and Rothmans Holdings Limited, also proposed to merge
to form British American Tobacco Australasia, Limited (BATA). A merger application was sub-
mitted to the ACCC to obtain clearance for the proposed merger between the parties.
For the ACCC, the central test in determining whether a merger is approved is determining
whether the acquisition will ‘substantially lessen competition’ under s 50 of the Trade Practices Act
6Competition Bureau Canada, 13 May 1999, Consent Order Sought from Competition Tribunal in To-
bacco Case. Available from http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/00730.html [accessed
on 5 July 2009]. New Zealand Commerce Commission, 5 February 2003, Media Release. Available from
http://www.comcom.govt.nz/business-competition-media-releases/detail/2003/commissionagreesout [accessed on
29 October 2010].
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1974 (Cth). The ACCC initially rejected the application, in March 1999, citing that the merged
company would have a market share of 62% and ‘would control nearly all of the major Australian
cigarette brands’ (ACCC, March 1999).7
In May 1999, it was proposed to the ACCC that a set of brands would be divested from BATA
to Imperial Tobacco Group PLC, another large international cigarette company that had not been
selling cigarettes in Australia. The divestiture proposal was accepted by the ACCC in June 1999
and clearance granted for the merger (ACCC, June 1999). Imperial Tobacco Group’s Australian
subsidiary was Imperial Tobacco Australia Ltd (ITA) which began trading on 3 September 1999
(ITA, 1999). At premerger shares, it was stated that BATA would have 44% and ITA 17% of the
market. ITA’s brands, as noted in Table 2, included one large discount brand, Horizon as well as
four other much smaller mainstream and discount brands.
3 The model
Anti-trust authorities have relied on a range of traditional empirical techniques, using data on
prices or market shares, in the hope of determining the anti-competitive effects of a merger.8
However, these techniques do not directly address the central concern of competition authorities
in a merger assessment, namely, the effects on consumer surplus. The effects on consumer surplus
can be assessed through merger simulations of oligopoly models.9 The parameters of these models
are usually supplied by estimating differentiated products models of demand. The most flexible and
sophisticated of these demand models is the random coefficients logit model.10 The application
of these models has, however, been limited by the considerable econometric skills required for
implementing them. Indeed, the computational aspects of implementing these models are still
7The approach of the ACCC reflects the qualitative nature of assessment used, following the ACCC’s Merger
Guidelines 1999. Empirical tools for assessment are not as widely used in Australian competition law as they are in
the United States or Europe, there being a ‘perceived reluctance’ by many parties there to utilise empirical analysis
techniques (King, 2005).
8These include, but are not limited to price/concentration analysis, elasticity analysis, critical loss analysis,
switching analysis and price correlation analysis: Introduction to Quantitative Techniques in Competition Analysis
[online], Lexecon. Available from http://www.crai.com/ecp/publications/2003/index.htm [accessed on 30 December
2009].
9See Budzinski and Ruhmer (2009) for a recent survey.
10As specified in Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (BLP) (1995) and applied in Nevo (2000) to a hypothetical merger.
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being debated.11 Furthermore, the use of simulated data can reduce the robustness and exact
replicability of the results — a feature desired by competition authorities investigating contentious
issues (King, 2005). Finally, collecting the data, programming, estimation and simulation can take
months and months of full-time work — which renders their use difficult when, as illustrated in
the case above, decisions must be made quickly.
Hence, we will focus on the nested logit model, which is a restricted version of the full random
coefficients logit model. The demand equation can be estimated quickly using a linear instrumental
variables regression in a standard econometrics package. There are dozens of published studies of
static differentiated products models, with many of these studies utilising various forms of nested
logits.12
3.1 Nested logit
The nested logit model is a discrete choice model in which consumers choose their most preferred
brand out of a set of brands or not to consume at all. Even though smokers consume multiple
cigarettes, choices of cigarette brands are discrete in the sense, as argued by McFadden, that even
when the consumer can afford more than one option people typically use only one brand at a
time (Anderson et al, 1992;3). Furthermore, experience estimating random coefficients models
with actual data (Nevo, 2000) and nested logit models with simulated data (Huang et al, 2008)
suggest that satisfactory results can be obtained analysing products with discrete brand choices.13
A potential complication is that the addictive nature of cigarettes makes the decision to smoke a
dynamic problem. This is probably more important for smoking, in general, than for smoking par-
ticular brands, and specification and estimation of dynamic models is even more computationally
involved.14
In the nested logit brands are are grouped into G + 1 mutually exclusive sets, g = 0, 1, ...G,
and the products in group g are denoted as ϕg. The variable common to all products in group
11See Knittel and Metaxoglu (2008) and Dube, Fox and Su (2008).
12Recent examples include Chiou (2008), Einav (2007) and Richards (2007).
13Hendel (1999) requires individual data as well as aggregate data to estimate a model of both brand choice and
quantity choice.
14See Aguirregabiria and Nevo (2010) for a recent survey.
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g is denoted as ζig, and this has a distribution function that depends on σ, where 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1.
For brand j denote xj as the set of observed product characteristics, ξj as an unobserved product
characteristic and pj as the price. In addition, for consumer i denote εij as the individual product
specific error term that is identically and independently distributed type I extreme value. The
utility of consumer i for product j can be writtten as,
uij = δj + ζig + (1− σ) εij (1)
where the mean utility, δj = xjβ−αpj+ξj. Cardell (1997) shows that if ε is a type I extreme value,
then this implies the error term, ζig + (1− σ) εij , is also a type I extreme value. The parameter
σ is referred to as the nesting coefficient. As σ approaches one, the within group correlation
of utility approaches one and the alternatives within the nest are closer and closer substitutes.
Conversely, as σ approaches zero, the within group correlation approaches zero and consumers’
tastes for products within a nest are increasingly independent.
Cardell’s result ultimately enables the derivation of a closed form equation for the market share
of brand j as derived in Berry (1994). The demand equation relating observed market shares, sj,
to market shares predicted by the model, χj, is given by,
sj = χj(δ(x, p, ξ); θ)
Defining Dg =
∑
jϕg
e
δj
(1−σ) , it can be shown that the market share for product j of entire market
is:
χj (δ;σ) =
e
δj
(1−σ)
Dσg
∑
gD
(1−σ)
g
(2)
With the outside good as only member of group zero, with market share s0, and normalising the
mean utility of outside good such that δ0 = 0, an equation suitable for estimation using a linear
instrumental variable regression can be derived as:
ln sj − ln s0 = xjβ − αpj + ξj + σ ln sj/g (3)
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where ξj is the error term. Instrumental variables are required as both pj and sj/g are endogenous.
The relative simplicity of the nested logit does come at a cost in that it allows correlation
patterns to depend only on predetermined groupings of products rather than explicitly on their
characteristics (Berry, 1994). Furthermore, as is well known, the functional form allows only
limited patterns of substitutability across products, as captured by the formulas for the own and
cross-price elasticities:
εjj = αjpj
[
sj − 1
(1− σ) +
σ
(1− σ)sj/g
]
(4)
εjk =

αkpk
[
sk +
σ
(1−σ)sk/g
]
if k 6= j and k ∈ g
αkpksk if k 6= j and k /∈ g
(5)
The formula for the cross-price elasticities plausibly requires greater substitutability with products
within the same nest than in a different nest, increasing with σ. However, we also see that the
cross price elasticities do not allow for any differences across brands. For example, all brands
within each group have an identical cross-price elasticity to the kth brand (though it differs if it is
included or not included in the same group).
3.2 Supply and equilibrium
In this subsection we present the assumptions required for performing the merger simulations.
First, for the five firms that operate in the Australian market between 1974 and 2000, denote Ff
as the set of the j = 1 , . . . , J brands owned by the f th firm where f = 1, . . . , 5. The profit of the
f th firm is:
Πf =
∑
j∈Ff
(pj −mcj)Msj (p)− Cf (6)
where mcj is the marginal cost of product j, Cf is the fixed cost of production, and M is the size
of the market. The equilibrium concept assumed for the oligopoly game is Bertrand-Nash in
prices. Denote Ωprejf as follows:
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Ωprejr =

−∂sj(p)
∂pr
, if∃f : {r, j} ⊂ Ff ;
0, otherwise.
(7)
Note the elements of this matrix depends on the assignment of brands to firms. We can then write
the first order conditions, in vector notation, to be satisfied in equilibrium as:
s (p)− Ωpre (p) (p−mc) = 0 (8)
This can be rearranged to solve for mc:
mc = p− Ωpre (p)−1 s (p) (9)
With estimates of the parameters and the data we can obtain estimates of marginal cost. Denote
Ωpost as the post-merger equivalent of Equation 7. We can solve for the post-merger price as the
solution to:
p∗ = mˆc+ Ωpost (p∗)−1 s (p∗) (10)
Once we have p∗ and s (p∗) we can estimate profits and consumer surplus. The per-consumer
consumer surplus is:
CS =
1
α
ln
(∑
D1−σg
g
)
(11)
4 Data
In this section we discuss the nature and sources of the data we use to estimate the nested logit
model. We also present and discuss some summary statistics from the data and raise some iden-
tification issues. Finally, we describe the variables we will use in estimation, and outline our
estimation strategy. The first set of data needed is the variables suggested by the model: prices
and market shares. The second set of data needed is a set of instruments for price and the within
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Table 3: Selected summary of descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Price 0.019 0.003 0.012 0.026
Number of Mainstream Brands 50.14 5.00 42 58
Number of Discount Brands 13.82 3.99 10 21
Brands sj 0.011 0.013 0.0002 0.068
Outside alternative s0 0.766 0.015 0.746 0.796
Note: The dataset has 294 observations
group market share, sj/g. Summary statistics for all dependant and explanatory variables are
reported in Table 3.
4.1 Market shares and prices by brand
Market share data for the largest cigarette brands is collected from the Tobacco Industry Document
Database.15 The database, which includes documents used during the trials as well as data from
other sources, was established in 1998 as part of the ‘Master Settlement Agreement’ reached
between between several U.S. state governments and U.S. tobacco companies regarding litigation
over the recovery of Medicaid costs associated with smoking related illnesses from the U.S. tobacco
industry. We use four reports compiled by Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds providing market
shares for the largest brands in Australia (which varies across the reports) by year, as well as
total cigarettes sold, for 1974 to 1984 and 1987 to 1992. Thirty-three different brands, listed in
Appendix C, are observed for varying periods in our dataset and make up between 80% to 90%
of cigarette sales. The Tobacco Industry Document Database also includes marketing reports for
Australia which we draw on to interpret our results.
Prices were collected from the lists of tax inclusive recommended retail and wholesale prices
for cigarettes per pack by brand in the June editions of the trade journal, Australian Retail
Tobacconist, and adjusted for inflation using the CPI.16 Each cigarette brand features a variety of
packaging alternatives and sizes. To make these comparable, we calculate the price per cigarette
stick and then average the per stick prices across the different alternatives to obtain a price for
each brand.
15Appendix A lists full references for internal industry documents used in collection of market share data.
16The May edition was used for 1975 and July edition used for 1987 when the June edition was unavailable.
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Because our price and tax data is at the state level but our market share data is at the national
level we need to aggregate the state data up to national data. Average price (tax) per cigarette by
state is weighted by state populations and aggregated to a national level. Weighting by population
is reasonable given that smoking prevalence rates across states are not significantly different from
each other.
4.2 Market share of the outside alternative
Because we observe the total factory made cigarettes sold we define the outside alternative as not
smoking factory made cigarettes. Market size is estimated on the basis of the number of smoking
opportunities per year. We make the assumption of 25 cigarettes per day per person.17 Hence the
total market in a year is calculated as 25 multiplied by the number of days in the year multiplied by
the population. For example, assume there are 100 people of which 30 smoke 20 cigarettes a day,
and one particular brand has 10% market share. Then the market share of the outside alternative
is 76% and the market share of the brand is 2.4%. By using not smoking as the outside good, our
results will also be of interest to those interested in the public policy issues around cigarette use
and enables comparison with estimates using aggregate data.
Note though that other tobacco related products are included in our outside goods — smokeless
tobacco, cigars, pipes, roll-your-own cigarettes and illegal cigarettes (chop-chop). In Australia,
most of these have very small market shares and any likely impact would be more on the demand
for cigarettes in general rather than the demand for specific brands of cigarettes.18 Furthermore,
these products tend to be excluded from other studies of the demand for cigarettes so our results
remain comparable.
17We used 25 days as we estimated the average daily number of cigarettes per smoker over the sample period
ranged from 16.3 to 19.5. We estimated the number of smokers using the predicted values from a regression of the
number of smokers in eight years as surveyed between 1974 and 1995, on a constant and time trend. Coefficients
were statistically significant and yielded an R-squared value of 0.92. The survey results are available from the
Australian Bureau of Statistics.
18As described in Winstanley et al (1995), smokeless tobacco products never had a sizeable market in Australia and
were progressively banned by the states and federally from the mid-1980s. Survey evidence in Hill and White (1995)
is that less than 2% of people smoke cigars or pipes and less than 8% of people smoke roll-your-own cigarettes. The
best estimate of illegal tobacco, PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2005) is that 1 in every 17 cigarettes smoked in Australia
is chop-chop though the same report emphasises it is probably more of a substitute for roll-your own cigarettes
than factory made cigarettes.
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One implication of defining non-smoking as the outside good is that brands with very small
market shares are not, as in other studies, included in the outside good. In our study they
are also not explicitly analysed as we observe prices but not brand market shares. We can still
identify all parameters of the model except for those on the dummy variables associated with
the missing brands. With their extremely small market shares, these brands are likely to be
unavailable from many retail outlets from which cigarettes are purchased and it is unlikely that
these brands affect the decisions made regarding pricing the larger brands. This segment of the
market, which presumably caters to consumers with strong preferences for particular brands, may
be better thought as monopolistically competitive. Hence not having estimates of their brand-
specific constants is unlikely to cause problems for our simulations or validation exercise.
4.3 Nests
An important part of the nested logit model is to classify brands into categories or groups. Brands
in each group share characteristics common only to that group. In this case brands were classified
by the availability of discount packs. Discount packs are classified as packs containing thirty or
more cigarettes, and have been purposely marketed at the price/value segment (Hirji, 1984). These
discount brands are characterised by prices which increase less than proportionately with quantity.
Internal documents and government reports were used to support brand classification. While the
cigarette companies identified three major segments, ‘Prestige,’ ‘Mainstream,’ and ‘Discount’, all
brands we observe are included in the ‘Mainstream’ and ‘Discount’ nests. The prestige brands were
sold in very small numbers and hence are not recorded among the major brands when calculating
market shares. Appendix C also classifies each brand we observe into their nest.
4.4 Other explanatory variables
We follow Nevo (2001) and include brand dummy variables, obviating the need for data on brand
characteristics, which in many cases is not available. Cigarettes as a product is very mature and
simple. There have been no major brand-specific changes in cigarettes as a product over our time
period and no major product relaunches. Furthermore, over most of our period advertising has
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been restricted which also limits the opportunities for manufacturers to suggest differentiation
between brands. Finally, brand fixed effects will control for, to a certain extent, correlation in
demand for particular brands over time.
We also follow Ackerberg and Rysman (2005) and include the number of mainstream and dis-
count brands as explanatory variables. Ackerberg and Rysman (2005) demonstrate an implication
of assuming logit εij is that each product is equally distinctive (though the value is random) in
terms of its unobserved characteristics. In other words, the entry of a new brand cannot crowd out
the demand for another product because of similar unobserved characteristics. This is unrealistic,
and while the nesting in our model helps to address this issue, it only works to the extent that the
relevant product characteristics are observed. This problem seems highly relevant for cigarettes
given the rapid expansion of discount brands and the large number of mainstream brands. Acker-
berg and Rysman (2005) argue that this problem can lead to biased estimates of parameters,
overpredict welfare gains from the introduction of new products, and affect price elasticities in
terms of both magnitudes and statistical significance. But they show the problem can be dealt
with by adding a function of the number of products in the nest into the demand equation. We
would expect to see a negative sign on the parameter which implies that there is congestion in the
product space.
4.5 Instruments
Once brand dummy variables are included in the regression, the error term is the unobserved
deviation from the overall mean valuation of the brand. Since firms observe and account for this
deviation, it will be correlated with prices and therefore least squares estimates will be inconsistent.
While Berry (1994) suggests using combinations of observed characteristics of the products as
instruments we cannot use this strategy to construct instruments as we have no variation in each
brand’s observed characteristics over time.
However, we have a set of instruments which are undoubtedly exogenous and important: state
and federal taxes. These can be used as instrumental variables because they are correlated with
the endogenous explanatory variables, price and within-group market share, but uncorrelated with
15
the error term and mean utility. Unlike product characteristics, these are not choice variables of
the firm, and so are unlikely to be correlated with demand shocks. Table 1 summarises the changes
in taxes over time.
The changes in taxes are substantial and evidence from PSA (1994) demonstrates that they
are important components of the price of a cigarette. Specifically, in 1993, for a 30-cigarette pack
in the state of New South Wales (NSW) 23.1% of the price goes to the manufacturer, 16.5% goes
to the retailer, 35.8% covers state tax and 24.6% covers federal excise. Hence, about a third of
the price of a pack of cigarettes reflects taxes that were not in existence (for NSW) at the start of
our sample period. Furthermore there has also been substantial movements in excise rates which
makes up a further quarter of the price of a cigarette pack.
The main drawback of using tax rates as an instrument is that they are not brand specific.
But because the state taxes are ad valorem, changes in the tax rates will have different effects on
different brands of cigarettes. We extract once lagged prices for all brands and multiply them by
the change in the tax rates. For new brands we choose the lagged value of a similar brand —
ideally by the same firm. We use changes in tax rates to reduce the endogenous component that
would occur if we used lagged taxes paid. Lagged taxes are substantially correlated with lagged
prices and would be an inappropriate instrument because it is likely that unobserved determinants
of brand market shares are correlated over time. Interacting the lagged price with the tax change
reduces this correlation.
An important advantage of using taxes as an instrument is that the effect on prices from
taxes, that are unlikely to be repealed, will be similar to that of a merger, in that such effects are
permanent (as opposed to using exogenous temporary variation such as weather driven tobacco
shortages). Because both changes are likely to be permanent, consumers are likely to respond in
similar ways.
5 Results
In this section we present the estimates of the nested logit demand model. In addition, we de-
termine that our simple model is robust to allowing coefficients to change over time and across
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Table 4: Results from nested logit model
Variable Coefficient
Price -32.55** (17.03)
ln sj/g (σ) 0.78*** (0.009)
Number of Mainstream Brands -0.007 (0.009)
Number of Discount Brands -0.014 (0.016)
Anderson Underidentification Test Reject***
Sargan Overidentification Test Fail to Reject
Cragg-Donald Weak Identification Test Fail to Reject
Observations 294
Significance: 1%***, 5%**, 10%*
nests. We then discuss the estimates of the own price elasticities, the cross price elasticities and
the elasticity of substitution to non-smoking. We then use our model to simulate the markups on
each brand, and predict the marginal costs. These are compared with estimates published by the
PSA.
5.1 Demand estimates
Table 4 presents the estimates of the nested logit model using IV regression. The coefficient on
price indicates there is a negative relationship between price and mean utility. This is plausible
given that one would expect an increase in price to correspond with a decrease in utility and is
consistent with the long held perception that cigarettes are normal goods.
In respect of σ, estimates between 0 and 1 are consistent with the requirements of the nested
logit. Somewhat unexpectedly, the insignificant coefficients on the number of mainstream and
discount brands suggests that product crowding is not an issue for the cigarette market. We
perform three tests for the overall performance of the IV regression. Sargan’s Overidentification
test indicates that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error terms and therefore there is no
systematic failure due to endogeneity or functional form. For structural models, this is a strong
result. We are also able to reject underidentification.19
19While the Stock-Yogo version of the Cragg-Donald test indicates that the instruments are weak, given the
positive results of the Anderson and Sargan tests, with the recent concerns about the power of the Stock-Yogo test
(Poskitt and Skeel, 2009), and the compelling exogeneity of tax increases, we are confident in our results.
17
Table 5: Results across periods
Period 1974-1984 1987-1992
Price -18.34 (13.14) -49.67 (41.91)
ln sj/g (σ) 0.63*** (0.14) 0.50*** (0.10)
Number of Mainstream Brands -0.011** (0.006) 0.0046 (0.015)
Number of Discount Brands -0.013 (0.047) -0.046* (0.033)
Anderson Underidentification Test Reject*** Reject***
Sargan Overidentification Test Fail to Reject Reject***
Cragg-Donald Weak Identification Test Fail to Reject Fail to Reject
Observations 179 115
Significance: 1%***, 5%**, 10%*
As previously noted, the period of the dataset is marked by a number of regulatory changes
and incremental increases in taxes. Due to these changes, the pool of consumers change as older
consumers die, younger consumers take up smoking, and a non-random set of consumers quit
smoking. Consumers who smoked during the 1970s may remember the successful advertising
campaigns on television, whereas those who took up smoking in the late 1980s will have observed
advertising only via sports sponsorships and ads in print. All of these changes may cause the
parameters of the model to change over time
Therefore we split the dataset into subsets to reflect the increase in advertising restrictions
and taxation towards the end of the first subset, and to account for the lack of market share data
for the period 1985 to 1986. Our results are presented in table 5. We note that the equations
for 1987-1992 fail Sargan’s overidentification test. As this period features the most substantial
increases in taxes, this is probably more likely due to a functional form issue than a failure of
exogeneity.
There are two notable changes in the coefficients. First, the increase in α suggests a general
increase in the sensitivity of all consumers in the later period to price. This is also noted in a report
by Philip Morris (Philip Morris USA, 1990). This may be a result of the increased restrictions on
the means by which firms can differentiate their products and the impact of health warnings on
consumer preferences, forcing firms to compete on price. Second, the lower estimate of σ in the
later period indicates that the degree of substitutability within nests fell. One possible explanation
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Table 6: Mainstream and discount nesting coefficients
Variables Coefficients
Price -37.73** (19.97)
ln sj/gmainstream (σ) 0.93*** (0.37)
ln sj/gdiscount (σ) 0.72*** (0.20)
Significance: 1%***, 5%**, 10%*
is that those smokers that did not give up smoking were those that tended to be most loyal to
smoking particular brands. It may also be a consequence of the greater restrictions in advertising
in the later period, which worked to limit tobacco companies’ influence in consumer choice and to
reinforce brand loyalty to those brands that are already established.
In respect of the coefficients on the number of brands of each group, the negative sign is
consistent with there being congestion. In each case the effect is larger for the discount brands than
for the mainstream brands. This is consistent with the discount brands being less distinctive from
one another compared with the mainstream brands, which were mainly launched before advertising
was restricted. This corresponds with the increase in the ‘crowding out’ effect resulting from the
increase in discount brands in the second period. For the mainstream brands, the effects are
stronger in the first period than the second period, which again corresponds with the decrease in
the number of mainstream brands in the second period.
Finally, we note that the specification in the model may be too restrictive in that it requires the
same value for the nesting coefficient, σ, for both mainstream and discount brands. As one group
of brands was largely introduced with extensive advertising and the latter without, it is plausible
that the degree of differentiation may be greater in the earlier group. Hence we re-estimate the
model allowing for separate nesting coefficients for each group and report the findings at Table 6.
The estimated nesting coefficient is greater for the mainstream brand than the discount brands
and a hypothesis test fails to reject that the two coefficients are identical. These equations also
fail to reject the null hypothesis of underidentification.
Compared with the first set of results, the specifications reported in tables five and six either
have more substantial econometric problems or fail to capture the expected heterogeneity across
time or over groups. Hence all remaining analysis will be done using the model reported in table
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Table 7: Sample of selected own price elasticities
Brand Average Maximum Minimum
All -2.89 -3.77 -1.99
Mainstream -3.34 -3.77 -2.29
Discount -2.63 -3.12 -1.99
four.
5.2 Own price elasticities
Table 7 summarises the estimates of the own-price elasticities by group and by market definition.
All are calculated as for 1992, the last year in our sample. Unsurprisingly, all elasticities are
negative. On average, the demand for mainstream cigarettes is more (own-price) elastic than the
demand for discount cigarettes.
This appears to go against common intuition. Mainstream brands are potentially more dif-
ferentiated in that firms have had greater opportunity through advertising to differentiate their
products. Therefore the theory is that greater differentiation should translate into greater degrees
of market power. Our results also appear to go against results found in other studies, such as
Tauras, Peck and Chaloupka (2006) who found that market shares for discount and deep discount
cigarettes are three or more times as responsive to own price changes than the mainstream market
shares.
We suggest that these striking results reflect that the mainstream brands are priced such that
firms are operating on sections of the demand curve in which market power has already been
extracted. In other words, the price of the mainstream cigarette has increased to the point where
it has attracted more and more substitutes and appears more elastic. Following from this theory,
we would therefore expect to see greater cross price elasticities between mainstream cigarette
brands than cross price elasticities between discount cigarette brands, and greater elasticities
of substitution between mainstream and non-smoking (the outside good) than the elasticities
of substitution between discount and non-smoking. Our results for cross price elasticities and
elasticities of substitution confirm this and are presented in the following sections.
The hypothesis that products can appear elastic was the reasoning which gave rise to the
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‘Cellophane fallacy’ in which Mueller and Stocking (1955) pointed out the error of concluding that
a monopolist was unable to exercise market power by raising price above the current price instead
of it having already exercised market power by raising price significantly above the competitive
price. Tobacco marketing documents suggest that mainstream brands were priced in this way
because they were the flagship brands of the particular company and were used to attract new
consumers. For example, Wills’ marketing strategy for Benson & Hedges was to increase the
appeal of the brand to 25-35 year old ‘YAUS’ (young adult urban smokers) (WD & HO Wills
(Australia) Limited, 1992). Flagship brands such as Winfield, Benson & Hedges and Marlboro
may attract new smokers who believe they will not be addicted to cigarettes. These consumers
are known as ‘chippers’ and are defined as smokers who consume less than five cigarettes a day
(Shiffman, 1989). Hence, image and taste, rather than price is a determining factor in initial
cigarette choice. These consumers may have relatively elastic demands because if the price of a
particular brand of mainstream cigarettes becomes too high, they will opt not to smoke or smoke
an alternative mainstream brand. Upon addiction, price plays an increasingly important factor
in cigarette choice and addicted consumers begin consuming discount brands. This approach
was taken by Wills, who in an internal company document acknowledged that the over 40 age
group were “more price conscious than the under 40’s, with the under 30’s franchise being key
target market prospects for high priced image brands” (WD & HO Wills (Australia) Limited,
undated). Thus, the relative inelasticity of discount brands may be reflective of higher degrees of
addictiveness.
5.3 Cross-price elasticities
A selected sample of cross price elasticities are presented in Table 8. Signs on the cross price
elasticities are positive, indicating that the brands are substitutes. While the results generated
appear small, this is a common feature of estimated differentiated products models.
As foreshadowed in section 5.2, the cross price elasticities are greater for mainstream brands
compared with the cross price elasticities generated for discount brands. We hypothesise that the
relative cross price inelasticity between the discount brands is reflective of the cycle of consumption
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Table 8: Cross price elasticities
Brand Combination Average Maximum Minimum
Discount wrt Mainstream 0.0069 0.024 0.0006
Mainstream wrt Discount 0.0053 0.019 0.0003
Within Mainstream 0.31 1.09 0.03
Within Discount 0.16 0.57 0.008
where consumers who initially smoke the mainstream brands turn to cheaper alternatives as they
become more price sensitive. Their level of addiction may be the factor influencing brand loyalty.
This is confirmed by the results generated for cross price elasticities between the groups. On
average, consumers who switch from mainstream to discount cigarettes have a higher cross price
elasticity than those consumers who would switch from discount to mainstream cigarettes. This
indicates that consumers are less likely to switch from discount cigarettes to mainstream cigarettes,
as consumers who are addicted and are price sensitive would be less inclined to purchase the more
expensive brands.
5.4 Elasticity of substitution to the outside good
The elasticities of substitution to the outside good are reported in Table 9. This statistic is of
greater interest than usual because of the public policy interest in whether individuals continue or
stop smoking.
As foreshadowed in section 5.2, the results show that the cross price elasticity between main-
stream cigarettes and not smoking is higher than the cross price elasticity between discount
cigarettes and not smoking. This is because consumers who begin with mainstream cigarettes
are more responsive to price changes in mainstream cigarettes, and would therefore be more likely
to quit smoking than those consumers who smoke discount cigarettes. The results are consistent
with our hypthesis above. The greater degree of addictiveness a consumer exhibits, the less likely
they will be to ‘consume’ the outside good (ie not smoking).
These estimates are much smaller than the own-price elasticities of demand for cigarettes
estimated using aggregate data. For example, Scollo et al (2003) cite research that states a typical
estimate for Australia is -0.4. The low estimates in table 9 are because these estimates are for an
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Table 9: Elasticity of substitution to the outside good
Brand Average Minimum Maximum
All 0.0059 0.0003 0.0241
Mainstream 0.0069 0.0006 0.0241
Value 0.0053 0.0003 0.0194
increase in the price of a single brand rather than a general increase in the price analysed with
aggregate data. Hence, many smokers would likely opt for another brand of cigarettes than to
make the harder decision to quit. To obtain an estimate comparable to those using aggregate data
we apply uniform proportional increases to the marginal cost of each brand (which we estimate
as described in the next sub-section) and solve for the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium set of prices.
Marginal costs are increased until the average equilibrium price of a cigarette increases by 1%. This
requires increasing brand marginal costs by 2.1%. We found that the market share of smoking had
fallen by 0.58%. It is not surprising that our estimate of the own-price elasticity is a bit greater
than the typical result as the prices of cigarettes had increased substantially, due to tax increases,
by the end of our sample period.
5.5 Marginal costs and markups
In order to simulate mergers and divestitures, estimates for marginal cost need to be obtained. As
described in section 3.3., we assume a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium and solve for the marginal costs
consistent with the observed prices, market shares and model parameters. The estimates of the
marginal costs are summarised by group in the first three columns of Table 10. These estimates
are then compared to estimates of marginal cost from external reports reported in the last three
columns of the table. We discuss how our estimates from external reports are obtained in Appendix
B but, in general, we combined some brand specific tax information from the Australian Retail
Tobacconist, and brand specific wholesale prices broken down into variable costs and margins using
an estimate of a typical decomposition in PSA (1994).
In respect of the estimates of marginal cost from the model, mainstream cigarettes are reported
to have higher marginal costs per stick than those of discount cigarettes. There are two reasons
which may explain the higher estimated marginal cost of mainstream cigarettes. First, excise on
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Table 10: Marginal costs
Estimates from model Estimates from external reports
Brand Average Maximum Minimum Average Maximum Minimum
All 0.012 0.018 0.007 0.015 0.018 0.011
Mainstream 0.015 0.018 0.011 0.017 0.018 0.016
Value 0.009 0.013 0.007 0.013 0.015 0.011
mainstream cigarettes tend to be greater by comparison to discount cigarettes. As explained in
section 2.2 mainstream brands have higher marginal costs due to containing more tobacco and
incurring greater taxes. Second, state taxes are calculated on the vale of cigarettes in dollar terms.
Since mainstream brands are typically more expensive, calculated state taxes are therefore larger.
Comparing the estimates from our model with the estimates compiled from external reports,
our results are broadly consistent. However, the marginal cost estimates generated from the nested
logit model tend to be systematically lower than those of external reports.
Using the marginal costs implied by the nested logit model, markups were calculated with the
results reported in Table 11. Across the two groups, the markups are on average higher on the
discount cigarettes than the mainstream cigarettes. This largely follows from the lower elasticity
of demand for discount cigarettes. While the prices on discount cigarettes are lower than on
mainstream, their costs are likely to be lower due to lower retail taxes and lower federal excise. We
note that in PSA (1994) and in some internal reports from tobacco companies, discount cigarettes
are suggested to have, on average, lower margins than mainstream cigarettes. There are two
reasons why our results may still be consistent with these reports. First, the markups reported in
our study are based on marginal production and taxation costs and do not include amounts spent
on price specialing. Price specialing is essentially a subsidy, involving the manufacturers paying
retailers an amount for each packet sold, on condition that the retailer resells at a lower retail price
(PSA, 1994). The levels of discounting have been reported to be greater for larger pack sizes than
smaller pack sizes (Scollo et al, 2000). Internal industry documents reveal that Philip Morris was
prepared to launch aggressive promotions of cheap brands “even at a considerable cost to margins”
(British American Tobacco Co., 1999), an example of which was the offer of free movie tickets with
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Table 11: Mark-ups
Brand Average Maximum Minimum
All 46% 62% 30%
Mainstream 39% 52% 30%
Value 50% 62% 40%
purchases of Peter Jackson cigarette cartons (Philip Morris, 1990). Second, it is not clear what
costs are included when markups are calculated in these reports. For example, when calculating
the wholesale margin in PSA(1994) indirect costs are included, which would be excluded in our
estimates.
Next we compare our estimated markups with estimates of typical markups provided in PSA(1994).
They suggest the typical retail margin on a packet of 30’s in NSW is approximately 16.5%. While
the wholesale margin is not stated, Figure 7.1 of the PSA report implies a margin of around 5%
of the wholesale price though indirect costs, such as marketing and administration, are included
in costs. When we exclude these costs the wholesale margin is closer to 32%. As the wholesale
price makes up 47.7% of the final price of a packet of 30’s in NSW, the combined (manufacturer
and retailer) margin is 32%. However, comparing the PSA’s estimates to our results suggests
that the model is over-estimating the markup. This is likely because the market was in fact more
competitive than that implied by the Bertrand-Nash assumption used to generate the marginal
costs. This may have been because Bertrand-Nash in differentiated products is not appropriate
for the cigarette industry at this period, or that the PSA was encouraging greater competition.
6 Merger and divestiture
In this section we apply our model to simulate the effects on prices and average consumer surplus
from the merger that was prevented in 1999 and from the partial divestiture approved by the
ACCC. As a base case for both simulations, we use the set of brands and estimated marginal
costs from 1992, the last year in the estimation sample. The seven year gap is unlikely to be
problematic as between 1992 and 1999 there are no major changes to the market structure —
only one small brand exits and one new brand is introduced. After discussing the results of our
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simulations, in section 6.4, we perform a validation exercise, comparing the simulated price changes
from the partial divestiture with the actual changes. Validating a partial divestiture is particularly
challenging because all prices are determined simultaneously. Hence a set of substantial shocks to
a large enough set of brands could potentially render all predictions wrong as other brands that
were not directly affected by the shocks, react to the prices of the shocked brands. Furthermore,
as described in section 6.3, this is complicated by a substantial increase in the tax on cigarettes
which happened almost simultaneously with the merger. Hence, in the validation, we focus on the
relative changes in the prices of the different brands rather than the absolute changes.
6.1 Simulation of the merger
Table 12 reports predicted price changes for discount and mainstream cigarette groups following the
merger. Our simulations predict that following the merger, the per stick prices of all brands owned
by BATA rise. The largest percentage increases would have occurred among mainstream brands.
Table 2 indicates that the merger would have brought together three of the four largest mainstream
brands. The relatively greater increase in the prices of former Wills brands (32.1% compared with
17.4% for Rothmans and 3.4% for Philip Morris) is consistent with this as competition would have
ceased from two large competitors, whereas for the former Rothman’s mainstream brands only one
major competitor would have been removed. The smaller proportional increases in the discount
market (9.3% for Wills, 16.8% for Rothmans and 4.1% for Philip Morris) is due to the combination
of Philip Morris having the two largest brands and Wills have three out of the next four largest
brands. The former Rothman’s discount brands increase their prices due to no longer competing
with the larger Wills brands. The general increase in the price of discount brand cigarettes would
have been due in part to the very large increases in mainstream cigarette prices. Philip Morris raises
its prices as well but to a much smaller degree — particularly in the mainstream market where
it has only one of the larger brands. Using equation 11 we can calculate that these price changes
reduced consumer surplus by approximately 7%. These results show the increase in market power
following the merger would have created considerable deadweight losses and is the first ground
upon which the ACCC’s actions in opposing the merger can be justified. However, these results
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Table 12: Predicted changes following merger
Company brands Discount Mainstream
BATA (merged entity) 13.5% 24.8%
Former Wills brands 9.3% 32.1%
Former Rothmans brands 16.8% 17.4%
Philip Morris 4.1% 3.4%
do not necessarily imply that the divestiture increased welfare, an analysis which we now turn to.
6.2 Simulation of the divestiture
We first analyse the predicted changes from the divestiture and our results are summarised in
Table 13. Our simulation predicts that the divestiture results in prices of discount cigarettes sold
by BATA increasing approximately 1.8% whereas those sold by ITA fall by 2%. ITA gains the
third largest discount brand from Wills as well as another one of Wills’ larger brands, Stradbroke.
Hence, those Will’s brands retained by BATA face a relatively tougher environment and cut their
prices by 3%. The position for the former Rothman’s brands held by BATA and ITA has improved
in that it no longer competes with one of the larger brands so the prices on former Rothman’s
brands rises by between 3 and 4 per cent. The price cuts for the former Wills discount brands
held by ITA can be rationalised because these brands now compete with Stradbroke. In general,
the average price changes are not enormous, nearly all falling in between ±4%.
By comparison, there are still substantial price increases of, on average, 18%, predicted for
the mainstream brands held by BATA after the divestiture as, implied by Table 2, three of the
four largest mainstream brands no longer compete with each other. Consistent with this intuition
is that the largest price cuts of 19% are on the Rothmans brands divested to ITA. They now
have to compete with the large mainstream brands retained by BATA. In another simulation not
reported here, we included Benson & Hedges, the largest mainstream brand of Wills, in the partial
divestiture and found found much smaller increases in the prices of mainstream brands. The
variation in price responses is much greater ranging from -19% to +25%.
The effect on consumer welfare, calculated using equation 11, compared with pre-merger was
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Table 13: Predicted and actual price changes following divestiture
Predicted price changes Actual price changes
Company Discount Mainstream Discount Mainstream
BATA (merged entity) +1.8% +17.8% 26.3% 14.1%
Wills brands owned by BATA -3.0% +24.5% 26.2% 12.7%
Rothmans brands owned by BATA 4.1% +11.1% 26.3% 15.4%
ITA -2.0% -12.6% 26.3% 15.7%
Wills brands owned by ITA -4.5% -6.3% 25.1% +19.8%
Rothmans brands owned by ITA 3.2% -18.9% 28.8% +11.7%
Philip Morris -0.04% 1.8% 20.3% 15.3%
to reduce average consumer welfare by about 2%. In comparison to the 7% reduction in consumer
welfare in the case of the merger, this provides the second ground upon which the ACCC’s actions
were justified in requiring a divestment of brands. However, it also provides grounds for the ACCC
perhaps having sought for a large mainstream brand to be divested from Wills or Rothmans to
ITA in order to better promote competition in the mainstream market.
6.3 Validation of the divestiture predictions
To evaluate the model’s predictions about the outcomes of the divestiture we collected data on
prices from the Australian Retail Tobacconist for June 1998, before the merger, and June 2000,
after the divestiture had been completed, and adjusted the data for inflation. However, we cannot
do a simple comparison of the predicted with the actual changes because of the complicating factors
outlined in section 6.3.1.
6.3.1 Tax changes during the validation period
By 1997, all state retail tax rates had become 100%. However, in 1997, the High Court ruled these
taxes unconstitutional. By the end of 1997 these taxes were replaced with an equivalent ad-valorem
surcharge on the federal excise that was then returned to the states. Then, in November 1999, the
excise was replaced with a per-stick tax of $0.18872 (Costello, 2000). The reason for this change
was because it was recognised that a weight charge encouraged manufacturers to make larger
numbers of lighter sticks. The government’s initial proposal stated that including the 10% GST
the price of premium cigarettes should only rise by 6.5% but that the price increase on discount
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cigarettes would be much greater (Costello, 1998). At the time the changes were made though
there was no official statement on what the expected price effects on cigarettes would be. BATA
stated in its GST compliance statement that prices had risen by 10% to 30% depending on pack
size following the change in excise (BATA, 2000). Finally, from 1 July 2000, the 10% GST was
introduced replacing a set of wholesale taxes. While in theory the change in the legal incidence
may have been less than 10% due to eliminating wholesale taxes, the GST compliance statements
of BATA and ITA stated that these credits were very small (BATA, 2000; ITA, no date).20
An additional complication is that due to public concern that firms would take advantage
of the tax changes to exert market power, the ACCC was required to extensively monitor all
companies pricing during this period (ACCC, July 1999). As part of this process, some of the
largest companies across the economy, including BATA and ITA, were invited to make public
statements about how they planned to comply with the GST, which we have already cited.
These changes have three implications for our validation exercise. First, the change to a per-
stick excise is likely to have substantially increased the price of discount cigarettes relative to
mainstream cigarettes. The price on mainstream cigarettes may have also increased in response
to the excise as well — either because of a higher tax or in response to higher prices on discount
cigarettes. Second, the introduction of the GST would have further increased the price of all
cigarettes. These changes mean we will only be able to focus on the predicted relative price
changes within discount and value cigarette brands rather than the absolute changes and changes
across the two groups. Third, if the merger created incentives to raise prices, firms (primarily
BATA) may have been reluctant to do so under this scrutiny. This would be of less concern for
firms that prefered to cut prices (primarily ITA) in response to the merger though. Hence, it is
possible that we may see more evidence of price cuts than price increases following the merger
during this period.
6.3.2 Comparison with actual price movements
The third and fourth columns of Table 13 contain the average actual price changes. The average
increase of the sets of discount brands are nearly all closely concentrated around 26% and the
20See Scollo et al (2004) for more details about this period.
29
average price increases for the mainstream brands are around 15% but more widely dispersed.
The higher average price increases for the discount brands compared with the mainstream brands
is consistent with the changes to the excise having greater effect on discount brands but the differing
variability is consistent with the predictions of the simulations.
With respect to the mainstream brands, the simulation predicted that the BATA brands would
have had the largest increases for the three companies, which did not occur. However, the relative
price changes of the brands taken by ITA are consistent with the simulation. The simulation
predicted that there would be much greater price cuts for the former Rothmans brands, as they
now competed with the successful mainstream Rothmans brands and it was the Rothmans brands
taken by ITA that experienced the lowest increase in response to the excise (11.% compared with
19.8%). The simulation also correctly predicted that Philip Morris would not substantially change
its prices in response to the merger.
With respect to the discount brands, BATA increases on average the prices of all of its brands
by around 26%. There is more variability in the price changes for the brands taken by ITA and
this is consistent with the predictions of the simulations, which suggested that the former Wills
brands would have their prices cut relative to the former Rothmans brands. Strikingly, Philip
Morris’s discount brands rise by 6 percentage points less than the average increase for the other
two companies brands — but this substantial relative price cut was not predicted by the model.
Overall, despite the tax changes and increased ACCC scrutiny, the nested logit model has been
able to successfully predict the direction of the average relative price movements for the brands held
by ITA — where ACCC scrutiny was less likely to be a problem — and, to a much lesser extent,
Philip Morris. In general, BATA did not appear to take advantage of the reduced competition
in mainstream cigarettes to increase the prices of its leading brands but ITA adjusted its relative
prices in a way consistent with the predictions of the nested logit for the partial divestiture. While
the partial success in predicting the outcome of the divestiture may reflect the effect of increased
monitoring and tax changes, it must be qualified by the caveat that the restrictiveness of the nested
logit in handling substitution patterns may have some impact on these results.
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7 Conclusion
The research question this paper seeks to address is whether simple structural econometric models
can inform counterfactual scenario analysis by anti-trust authorities faced with an anti-competitive
merger. We estimated a simple nested logit model of demand for cigarettes using a new dataset
constructed from industry documents and various external sources. The nested logit produced
coefficient values and demand elasticities that resemble those found in the extensive literature
on cigarette demand. We were then able to simulate two counterfactual scenarios — a merger
between two of the three largest cigarette companies in Australia, Wills and Rothman, and a
merger involving a partial divestiture to an entrant, ITA.
The results of our merger simulation suggested that, on competition policy grounds, the ACCC
was correct to oppose the merger as it would have led to substantial price increases and substantially
lower consumer welfare. The results of our partial divestiture simulation suggest that the partial
divestiture would have substantially reduced the negative effects of the merger in the discount
cigarette market but still enabled an increase in market power in the mainstream cigarettes market.
Overall the loss in consumer welfare was less than a third of that if the merger had been permitted
to go ahead. We suggest that greater welfare improvements might have been obtained if the ACCC
were able to assess various brand mix ownership arrangements. While validating our results from
the simulation of the partial divestiture were complicated by substantial tax changes occurring at
the time and the increased ACCC scrutiny of pricing by large companies, we found that our model
successfully predicted the relative price changes by the entrant receiving the divested brands.
Importantly, the significance of these results is that it is worthwhile further investigating the
performance of nested logit in other industries unencumbered by the intense regulation of the
cigarette market, in that it can provide quick results and a general indication of welfare effects
for anti-trust authorities who wish to supplement their qualitative analysis with a more rigorous
quantitative assessment.
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A Sources for market share data
Market share data was obtained from the following internal documents which are downloadable
from http://old.tobacco.health.usyd.edu.au/site/gateway/docs/advsearch.htm:
• RJ Reynolds Tobacco International. 1979. Australia 1980 Business Plan. Bates no.
505525644/505525648. [accessed on 13 November 2010].
• Philip Morris International. 1983. Philip Morris International Fact Book. Bates no.
2500085185/2500085236. [accessed on 13 November 2010].
• Philip Morris International. March 1985. Philip Morris International Fact Book Bates no.
2026306424/2026306514.[accessed on 13 November 2010].
• Philip Morris International. April 1993. 1993 world cigarette fact book: Philip Morris Inter-
national Fact Book Bates no. 2500058766/2500059015. [accessed on 13 November 2010].
B Breakdown of wholesale price
Marginal cost from external reports had to be estimated from the wholesale price charged by each
firm as reported in the Australian Tobacco Retailer. We calculate the marginal cost of a cigarette
sold to the consumer as the sum of three components. The first component is the state retail taxes,
which we observe. The other two components are the federal excise tax and the manufacturer’s
direct costs of production. We do not observe the latter components but in Figure 7.1 of the PSA
(1994), included below, a diagram shows the average percentage of raw materials, direct labour,
indirect costs, excise and margin of a wholesale price. Excise is reported on average to be 53%
of the wholesale price. Direct labour and raw materials account for approximately 15% of the
wholesale price. We apply these percentages to all wholesale prices to estimate the excise and
direct costs for all cigarettes.
There are likely to be systematic differences between these estimates and the estimates from
the model for two reasons. First, if different firms have different costs, there will be systematic
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differences across firms in that, for example, the costs for a low cost suggested by the model will
be smaller than the average estimates. Secondly, the model may imply lower costs for all firms
than the average cost if the market is more competitive than the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium.
Source: PSA (1994)
C Classification of brands into nests
Mainstream:
• Philip Morris: Alpine, Du Maurier, Marlboro, Park Drive, Viscount.
• Wills: Albany, Ardath, Benson & Hedges, Claridge, Craven A, John Player*, Kent, Kool.
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• Rothmans: Dunhill, Peter Stuyvesant*, Rothmans, Winfield.
• RJ Reynolds: Camel (from 1992 on, distributed by Rothmans).
Discount:
• Philip Morris: Black & White, Fortune, Longbeach, Peter Jackson, Superlights.
• Commodore, Escort*, Horizon*, Stradbroke, Wills.
• Rothmans: Brandon*, Cambridge, Holiday, Ransom, Special Mild.
*Brands divested to Imperial Tobacco Australia.
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